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Antitrust Law and Economic Theory:
Finding a Balance
Edward D. Cavanagh*

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have relied more and
more on economic theory to inform their antitrust analyses.
Economic theory has indeed provided guidance with respect to
antitrust issues and assisted the courts in reaching rational
outcomes. At the same time, infusion of economic evidence into
antitrust cases has made these cases more complex, lengthier, more
expensive to litigate, and less predictable.
This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between
facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The
problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in
antitrust cases, but rather that courts have become too reliant on
economic theory in deciding them. Just as courts of an earlier
generation became too enamored of per se rules in antitrust cases, some
courts today have become too enamored of economic theory in
addressing and resolving antitrust issues. Some courts have lost sight
of basic antitrust goals and have gotten bogged down in arcane
economic tests—relevant market and proof of common impact in class
action cases are two examples—which have become obstacles to,
instead of tools for, resolution of antitrust disputes. Antitrust is a body
of law enacted by Congress and construed by the courts; it is not a
compendium of the latest thinking in economic theory. The role of the
courts is not to decree economic policy, but rather to implement
antitrust policies enacted by Congress. Antitrust has always been a
fact-specific enterprise, and courts need to restore the proper balance

* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professor Kevin Grady and Professor Max Huffman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
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123

124

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

between fact finding and economic theory by confining economic theory
to those areas where it assists antitrust analysis and discarding such
theory where it gets in the way. In short, courts need to return to
simple, predictable, and administrable—but informed—antitrust rules.
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INTRODUCTION
“Antitrust [law] is not that complicated.”1 –Richard M. Steuer.
The prohibitions of the antitrust laws are disarmingly simple. Section
1 of the Sherman Act declares unlawful any “contract, combination . . .
Section 2 bars
or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade.”2
“monopolization, attempted monopolization or conspiracy to
monopolize.”3 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions
“where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”4
Richard Steuer has suggested that these statutory prohibitions can be
distilled down to two types of behavior: ganging up and bullying. 5
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the statutory formulations,
application of the antitrust laws to day-to-day business practices has
proven to be no facile undertaking. Any attempt to recreate real-world
price-output decisions in the courtroom is a daunting task,6 requiring
courts to undertake detailed examinations of market facts and to analyze
the views of opposing economics experts as to whether the conduct in
question ultimately promotes or impairs competition. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has long held that alleged anticompetitive conduct must
be analyzed in its factual context and condemned only if, on balance,
anticompetitive effects outweigh procompetitive benefits. 7 On the other
hand, it has also cautioned that courtrooms should not be transformed
into intermediate microeconomics classrooms.8 Put another way, there
1. Richard M. Steuer, The Simplicity of Antitrust Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 543, 557 (2012).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
3. Id. § 2.
4. Id. § 18.
5. Steuer, supra note 1, at 543 (“[A]ntitrust law focuses simply, and entirely, on combating
two of the most innate proclivities in human nature—bullying and ganging up—when such
conduct harms competition.”).
6. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731–32 (1977) (stressing “the uncertainties and
difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions in the real economic world rather than an
economist’s hypothetical model” (internal quotations omitted)).
7. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied . . . .”).
8. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court underscored the limitations of using economic
evidence to re-create real world price/output decisions:
Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic theory provides a precise
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is a limit on the amount and type of economic evidence that a trial court
can competently entertain.
Pinpointing that limit has proven to be a challenge for antitrust
courts. In the early years of the antitrust laws, courts favored
predictable, workable rules and sought to avoid detailed assessment of
economic evidence, thereby giving birth to an era of per se analysis.
The Supreme Court summarily condemned horizontal price fixing9 and
division of markets,10 as well as tying arrangements.11 The Court also
condemned out of hand, at least initially, resale price maintenance 12 and
vertically imposed territorial restraints.13 Over the years, a strong
consensus for per se treatment of horizontal arrangements affecting
price has emerged. The same is not true for vertical restraints, and
whatever consensus for per se treatment of vertical restraints that may
have existed collapsed under the weight of cogent Chicago School
criticism. Chicago School economists, relying on the neoclassical
model and its two basic assumptions that (1) markets are selfcorrecting; and (2) firms and consumers generally behave rationally and
act as profit-maximizers,14 urged that vertical restraints are rarely, if
formula for calculating how the overcharge is distributed between the overcharged
party (passer) and its customers (passees). If the market for the passer’s product is
perfectly competitive; if the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the passer’s
competitors; and if the passer maximizes its profits, then the ratio of the shares of the
overcharge borne by passee and passer will equal the ratio of the elasticities of supply
and demand in the market for the passer’s product. Even if these assumptions are
accepted, there remains a serious problem of measuring the relevant elasticities—the
percentage change in the quantities of the passer’s product demanded and supplied in
response to a one percent change in price. In view of the difficulties that have been
encountered, even in informal adversary proceedings, with the statistical techniques
used to estimate these concepts, it is unrealistic to think that elasticity studies
introduced by expert witnesses will resolve the pass-on issue.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 741–42 (citations omitted).
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940) (ruling that pricefixing constitutes a per se undue restraint on interstate commerce).
10. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (holding that horizontal
territorial restraints are a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
11. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (stating that tying
arrangements are per se violations of the Sherman Act).
12. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 385 (1911) (holding that a
plan to maintain prices “falls within the principle which condemns contracts of this class”),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
13. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (“[W]here a
manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se
violation of the Sherman Act results.”), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
14. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, F.T.C., Remarks Before the Vienna Competition Conference,
Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead 7–8 (June 9, 2010),
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ever, anticompetitive and almost always serve to promote
competition.15 In the mid-1970s, courts swayed by Chicago School
scholars began to embrace economic theory in examining antitrust
issues16 and the neoclassical model became the predominant vehicle for
antitrust analysis.17
Not surprisingly, now that economics and econometrics are front and
center in antitrust analysis, the first call, once parties have “lawyered
up,” is to an expert economist. Particularly in merger cases, a team of
expert economists with a phalanx of support staff immediately appears
on the scene. Economics “has provided greater insight [to antitrust
issues] but added to the terminological clutter.”18 But, terminological
clutter is only one of the many problems resulting from the influx of
economic data in assessing whether particular conduct violates the
antitrust laws. Discovery is lengthier and even more expensive; in
limine motions challenging expert evidence under Daubert have
become routine;19 issues have grown more complicated; and outcomes
are harder to predict. Courts, in developing antitrust standards, have
long struggled to balance the need for detailed market analysis against
the need for predictable, workable rules. These developments have not
gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court. In recent decisions, the Court
has acknowledged the challenges that economic analysis of antitrust
issues presents to generalist judges and to juries.20 Somewhat
anomalously, the Court appears to solve the problem by advocating for
trial courts to dismiss these cases at the outset rather than go through a

available at http://www ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf.
15. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 288
(1978) (“Analysis shows that every vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”).
16. See Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 56 (relying on the economic theories of Chicago scholars
to reject the notion that the per se rules applicable to “sale” transactions should be expanded to
“nonsale” transactions).
17. See Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust: Unanswered Questions on the Horizon,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, at 1–4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun10_Reeves6_24f.authcheckdam.pdf.
18. Steuer, supra note 1, at 543–44.
19. See ZF Meritor, L.L.C. v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
reliability analysis [required by Daubert] applies to all aspects of an [economic] expert’s
testimony . . . .” (first alteration in original)), cert. denied, 133. S. Ct. 2025 (2013).
20. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007) (expressing doubt that
“careful case management” and “lucid instructions to juries” can effectively eliminate infirm
claims); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (stating that unlawful exclusionary conduct would prove to be a “daunting task” for
“generalist” antirust courts).
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costly and lengthy trial and run the risk of an erroneous outcome. 21 The
irony here, of course, is that on the one hand, the Supreme Court
encourages trial courts to admit economic evidence, and yet on the
other, the Court maintains that this type of evidence is too complicated
for judges and juries to handle.
This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between
facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The
problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in
antitrust cases, but rather that courts have become too reliant on
economic theory in deciding antitrust issues. Just as courts of an earlier
generation became too enamored of per se rules in antitrust cases, some
courts today have become too enamored of economic theory in
addressing and resolving antitrust issues. Some courts have lost sight of
basic antitrust goals and have gotten bogged down in arcane economic
tests—relevant market and proof of common impact in class action
cases are two examples—which have become obstacles to, instead of
tools for, resolution of antitrust disputes. Antitrust is a body of law
enacted by Congress and construed by the courts; antitrust is not a
compendium of the latest thinking in economic theory. As Justice
Breyer, dissenting in Leegin, observed:
Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court relies upon, can
help provide answers . . . and . . . economics can, and should, inform
antitrust law. But antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely
replicate economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. That is because
law, unlike economics, is an administrative system the effects of
which depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they
are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising
their clients. And that fact means that courts will often bring their
own administrative judgment to bear, sometimes applying rules of per
se unlawfulness to business practices even when those practices
sometimes produce benefits.22

The role of the courts is not to decree economic policy but rather to
implement antitrust policies enacted by Congress. Antitrust has always
been a fact-specific enterprise, and courts need to restore the proper
balance between fact finding and economic theory by confining

21. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through
‘careful case management,’ given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (internal citations omitted)).
22. Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914–15 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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economic theory to those areas where it assists antitrust analysis, and
discarding such theory where it gets in the way. In short, we need a
return to simple, predictable, and administrable—but informed—
antitrust rules.
I. THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST IN AMERICA
In his groundbreaking book, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War
With Itself, the late Robert Bork argued that the Sherman Act was
enacted to protect consumers,23 a view that has been accepted
categorically by some antitrust courts, scholars and practitioners.24
Bork’s view, although perhaps “good economics,” is “bad history.”25
Economic efficiency was not the driving force behind the Sherman Act.
Rather, the antitrust movement was rooted in agrarian opposition to
bigness and was driven by factors that were not exclusively economic in
nature.26 These values include:
[F]irst, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power will
breed antidemocratic political pressures, and, second, a desire to
enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range with
which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the
welfare of all. A third and overriding political concern is that if the
free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under
antitrust rules that are blind to all economic concerns, the likely result
will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will
be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in
economic affairs.27

Indeed, not until 1978 did the Supreme Court hold definitively that
consumers could be “injured in [their business or] property” and thus
would have standing to assert treble damage claims.28
This is not to suggest that economic efficiency is not (or should not
be) a major goal of antitrust policy.29 The point is simply that an
23. See BORK, supra note 15, at 51 (“The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the
maximization of consumer welfare . . . .”).
24. Id. at 17–21; see, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376
(7th Cir. 1983) (“The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition
dominates current thinking, judicial and academic, in the antitrust field.”).
25. David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 n.213 (2003).
26. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1058–60
(1979) (stating that legislative history shows that Congress was concerned with the disappearance
of small businesses and sought to create procedural protections for distributors).
27. Id. at 1051.
28. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 340–42 (1979). Section 4 of the Clayton Act
mandates that the court triple antitrust damage awards. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
29. See Pitofsky, supra note 26, at 1051 (“This view is not at odds with the central beliefs of
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antitrust regime driven exclusively by economic concerns is out of step
with the fundamental concerns of the Sherman Act.30 Fashion
Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC31 illustrates the proposition that
antitrust goals are not limited to assuring economic efficiency. In that
case, a group of manufacturers of women’s garments (“FOGA”), under
the guise of preventing style piracy, imposed a comprehensive set of
restrictions on retailers selling women’s clothes.32 The Supreme Court
held that FOGA’s pervasive scheme of private regulation and policing
of the fashion industry usurped Congress’s regulatory powers and for
that reason alone violated the antitrust laws.33 As demonstrated below,
the courts have historically rejected an exclusively economic approach
in addressing antitrust issues.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
A. Simple Rules (1890–1977)
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade.”34 Initially, the
courts had some difficulty defining “restraint of trade.” In TransMissouri, Justice Peckham, construing this statute literally, ruled that
section 1 prohibits any and all agreements that restrain trade.35
Subsequently, Judge Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Addyston
Pipe, ruled that ancillary restraints of trade, lawful at common law, are

both the ‘Chicago’ and ‘Harvard’ schools that the major goals of antitrust relate to economic
efficiency . . . .”).
30. Id. (“[I]f the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules
that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy . . . dominated by
a few corporate giants . . . .”).
31. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
32. Id. at 463. In addition to combating style piracy, the FOGA scheme (1) prohibited
members from engaging in retail advertising and sales; (2) regulated discounts; (3) regulated days
on which special sales could be held; (4) prohibited sales to those selling from residences; and (5)
denied benefits of memberships to retailers who participated with dress manufacturers in
promoting fashion shows unless the merchandise was actually purchased and delivered. Id.
33. Id. at 465 (“[T]he combination is in reality an extra-governmental agency, which
prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial
tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus ‘trenches upon the power of
the national legislature and violates the statute.’” (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899))).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
35. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 325 (1897) (“[Section 1]
prohibits contracts, combinations, etc., in restraint of trade or commerce.”).
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lawful under the Sherman Act, if reasonable, but that naked restraints of
trade—restraints whose sole purpose is to restrain competition—are
unlawful on their face.36 In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court later
rejected Justice Peckham’s literal approach and held that the term
“every” in section 1 should not be construed literally and that the statute
prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade.37 Thus was born the rule of
reason as the operative legal standard under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Thereafter, in Chicago Board of Trade, the Court elaborated on
the application of the rule of reason to a given set of facts:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by
so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences.38

In short, under the rule of reason, a court must weigh procompetitive
benefits against anticompetitive effects and determine, on balance,
whether particular conduct restrains trade. This is a demanding task;
and, not surprisingly, courts began to look for shortcuts in the
application of the rule of reason. Early on, the courts determined that
some horizontal arrangements—notably agreements among competitors
to fix prices39 or to divide territories40—were so pernicious and so
36. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–84 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[W]here
the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed therein is merely to restrain
competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that there is nothing to justify or
excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would
be void.”), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
37. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911) (“The statute under this view
evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts . . . which did not
unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being
restrained by methods . . . which would constitute an . . . undue restraint.”).
38. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
39. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 166–68 (1940) (stating that
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likely to be devoid of procompetitive benefits that they could be
condemned as unlawful without a detailed inquiry into market facts.
Per se rules offer several significant benefits to courts and litigants
alike. First, per se rules create bright-line demarcations, making it clear
whether the conduct in question is lawful or unlawful. 41 Clarity is
particularly important in horizontal price-fixing cases where a violation
can give rise to criminal sanctions and potential treble damages
liability.42 Second, per se rules provide predictability to those making
business decisions.43 Unlike the Brandeis formulation of the rule of
reason, which essentially provides an ex post assessment of conduct that
has already occurred, the per se rule provides an ex ante guidepost as to
the legal risk of undertaking certain conduct. Third, per se rules are
readily administrable by the courts.44 Per se rules limit the proof that a
defendant may offer to justify its behavior and thus remove from the
courts the burden of weighing procompetitive benefits against
anticompetitive effects.45 That burden is considerable. As Justice
Marshall observed in writing for the majority in Topco: “The fact is that
courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems.
Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion in another
sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.”46
Given these practical difficulties, Marshall observed that absent a
directive from Congress, courts are not “free to ramble through the
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.”47
Fourth, per se rules promote efficiency.48 Precisely because per se rules
limit proof at trial, they limit the cost of adducing evidence and the
length of trials. Limitations on the amount of proof also typically mean
oil companies conspired to fix gasoline prices).
40. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) (explaining that
mattress companies agreed not to sell certain brands in particular areas).
41. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW. 435, 445
(2012) (“Per se rules draw bright-line rules as to whether conduct is lawful or not.”).
42. Id. (“Clarity is especially important in the price-fixing realm, where a violation can give
rise to criminal sanctions.”).
43. Id. (positing that per se rules create ex ante standards where liability is predictable).
44. Id. (noting that per se rules limit proof, inferably removing administrative burdens).
45. Id. (“Per se rules limit proof and remove from the court the burdens of having to weigh
benefits to one sector of the economy against harms to another sector.”).
46. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972).
47. Id. at 610 n.10.
48. See Cavanagh, supra note 41, at 445 (“[B]ecause the per se rule limits proof, it limits the
cost of adducing evidence and the length of trials. Less proof also typically means simplification
of issues and less wear and tear on both the litigants and the judiciary.”).
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simplification of issues and less wear and tear on both the court and
litigants.
Not surprisingly, developments in the law of vertical restraints
mirrored those in the horizontal area, at least initially. Thus, resale
price maintenance49 and vertically imposed territorial restraints,50 such
as location clauses, were condemned as per se unlawful. In formulating
rules governing vertical restraints, the courts again studiously avoided
incorporating economic analysis. For example, the Supreme Court in
Dr. Miles summarily condemned resale price maintenance, not because
it inevitably led to higher prices for consumers but rather because it
violated the traditional common law rule against restraints on
alienation.51 Despite the clear ruling in Dr. Miles condemning vertical
price fixing, resale price maintenance (“RPM”) has never carried the
same opprobrium as horizontal price-fixing. Criminal sanctions for
RPM are almost unheard of.52 Moreover, during the Great Depression,
Congress permitted a revival of RPM by enacting so-called Fair Trade
Laws, which authorized states to pass legislation permitting
manufacturers to impose their prices on retailers.53
On the other hand, the courts have waffled in their treatment of nonprice vertical restraints. Initially, in White Motor, the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s arguments (and the decision below) that
vertically imposed territorial restraints should be declared per se
unlawful.54 However, five years later in Schwinn, the Supreme Court
changed its tune and condemned out of hand non-price vertical
restraints imposed on dealers when the manufacturer departed with

49. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 385 (1911) (holding that
retail price maintenance “falls within the principle which condemns contracts of this class”),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
50. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1979) (“[W]here a
manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se
violation of the Sherman Act results.”), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 35 (1977).
51. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404 (“[A] general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid . . .
and . . . generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy.”).
52. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D. Conn.
1981) (resulting in a nolo contendere plea and a fine of $250,000).
53. See, e.g., Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, 50 Stat. 693, 693–94 (1937)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)); McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631, 632 (1952) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964)) (amending the Federal Trade Commission Act).
54. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (“This is the first case
involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual
impact of both that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion on the bare
bones of the documentary evidence before us.”).
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“title, dominion, or risk.”55 On the other hand, where the manufacturer
retained title, dominion, and risk by restructuring sales transactions as
agency arrangements or consignment deals, the restraints would be
upheld where reasonable.56 The Schwinn rule was heavily criticized
because it was directed to the form, not the substance, of a transaction.57
Many enterprises preferred sales to agency distribution models, but
some firms attempted to take advantage of the Schwinn safe harbor.
The post-Schwinn treatment of vertically imposed territorial restraints
followed an erratic course in the lower courts.58 As a halfway measure,
some sellers abandoned location clauses and chose to impose less
restrictive measures, such as areas of primary responsibility clauses,
which required a dealer to exploit a given territory, or “pass-over”
clauses, which required invading dealers to compensate the dealers
whose area of primary responsibility had been infringed for lost
promotional and advertising expenses.59 These were, at best, stopgap
measures and did not address the real problem that the Schwinn rule was
directed at form, not substance.
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Historically, there have been two approaches to monopolization law:
the conduct approach and the structural approach.60 The former
approach focuses on bad acts by dominant firms.61 Under the structural

55. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 378–79.
56. Id. at 381 (holding that where a manufacturer adopts such a system, “absent price fixing
and in the presence of adequate sources of alternative products to meet the needs of the
unfranchised[,] [the vertically imposed distribution restraints] may not be held to be per se
violations of the Sherman Act”).
57. BORK, supra note 15, at 285 (“Antitrust is capable of sustaining meaningless distinctions
and sterile paradoxes, but those of Schwinn were too many and too obvious to persist for long.
The precedent suffered a timely and deserved demise shortly after its tenth anniversary.”).
58. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1313–20 (5th
Cir. 1976) (detailing post-Schwinn cases and stating, “post-Schwinn [case law] . . . has followed
an erratic course.”).
59. See Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs. Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150–51 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (holding that no violation of the Sherman Antitrust laws resulted where one licensee paid
7% of the gross sales receipts for sales outside his area of primary responsibility to the licensee in
whose area the sales were made).
60. See Oliver Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure
Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1972) (acknowledging both the conduct and the
structural approaches by noting that the Supreme Court has rejected a purely structural approach,
requiring some showing of abusive conduct (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570–71 (1966))).
61. Id. at 1512 (“Traditional judicial interpretations of the offense of monopolization . . . have
focused on the presence or absence of . . . exclusionary tactics . . . .”).
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approach, size alone may be sufficient to condemn a dominant firm; that
is, bigness is badness.62 In the landmark Standard Oil decision in 1911,
the Supreme Court focused largely on the predatory acts of Standard Oil
in achieving total dominance in the oil business.63 In the mid-twentieth
century, the structural approach came into vogue, perhaps best
exemplified by Learned Hand’s opinion in Alcoa.64 In Alcoa, Learned
Hand stressed the virtues of competition and the dangers that inevitably
arise from the lack of competition.65 The structural theory, however,
has never gained traction in the Supreme Court, and post-Alcoa cases
have stressed that proof of market dominance and bad acts are essential
to establishing a monopolization claim.66 The common thread in both
these approaches was that each was intuitive in nature. In Standard Oil,
the Supreme Court condemned the bullying tactics—predatory pricing,
secret rebates, consolidation under false pretenses—of a dominant firm
without any meaningful effort to draw a line between lawful and
unlawful behavior.67 Unlike the highly developed section 1 case law,
section 2 remains a fertile area for judicial analysis.
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers “where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such [merger] may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”68 As originally enacted
in 1914, section 7 contained a loophole in that it addressed only those
62. Id. at 1512–13 (“[A] firm may be found to have monopolized a market unlawfully simply
by maintaining monopoly power for a period of time substantial enough to indicate that market
forces by themselves will be unable to undo the firm’s dominant position.”).
63. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1911) (reiterating the averments that
two companies had monopolized and restrained interstate commerce).
64. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter
Alcoa] (“Alcoa’s size was magnified to make it a monopoly . . . and its size, not only offered it an
opportunity for abuse, but it utilized its size for abuse, as can easily be shown.” (internal
quotations omitted)), superseded by statue, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a (2012).
65. Id. at 427 (“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”).
66. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (noting that the
elements of monopolization are monopoly power plus “willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident”).
67. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 42–43, 72–77.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
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mergers accomplished through stock acquisition and did not affect
mergers effectuated through asset acquisition.69 That loophole was
closed by enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment in 1950;70 and
with that change in law, the era of merger enforcement began.
Two things are noteworthy about the section 7 standards. First, the
statute requires evidence of likely anticompetitive effect in “any line of
commerce . . . in any section of the country”; at a minimum, the merger
must be analyzed in the context of the product market and geographic
market in which it occurs.71 Then, the fact-finder must determine
whether a merger is likely to lessen competition or—worse—create
monopoly in the market as defined. Second, unlike section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which requires proof of an actual restraint of trade to
establish a statutory violation, mergers violate section 7 of the Clayton
Act only where the effect of those mergers “may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”72 The Clayton Act
has a prophylactic element—missing in the Sherman Act—that permits
public enforcers or private litigants to nip anticompetitive acquisitions
in the bud before those acquisitions have caused actual economic harm.
Thus, in evaluating mergers, courts have to predict the likely
competitive impact of any transaction rather than simply determine
whether competition has, in fact, been lessened. Economic data,
including market definition, market power, entry and exit patterns,
likely efficiencies, profitability, and innovation provide the courts with
the tools to make those decisions.
A historical review of merger enforcement underscores the
importance of economic data in evaluating acquisitions under the
Clayton Act. In the early years, the courts, focusing more on sociopolitical concerns than on economic concerns in assessing mergers, both
undervalued and underutilized economic data. The Brown Shoe case is
a textbook example.73 Brown Shoe, the third largest shoe retailer with
1230 stores, acquired Kinney Shoes, the eighth largest shoe retailer with

69. Id. (“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock . . . where in any line of commerce . . . the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.” (emphasis added)).
70. Id. §§ 18, 21.
71. Id. § 18.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), superseded by statute, Patent
Misuse Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
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350 stores.74 Together, the merged entity would become the second
largest shoe retailer and control 2.3% of retail shoe outlets and 7.2% of
all shoe stores.75 After defining the relevant product and geographic
markets and reviewing the merger trends in the shoe industry, the Court
found that in 118 cities, the combined Brown-Kinney market share
would exceed 5%.76 Focusing solely on structural effect, the Court
concluded that a merger creating a firm with at least 5% of the relevant
market was likely to diminish competition.77
Even more interesting was the Court’s largely socio-political
rationale for striking down the merger. First, the Court identified a
significant trend toward concentration in the shoe industry and stated:
“If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be
required to approve future merger efforts by Brown’s competitors
seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid
would then be furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve the
combinations previously approved.”78
Second, the Court ruled that mergers involving chain stores must be
closely scrutinized because: (1) chain stores can be isolated from
competition; (2) chain stores can set styles that make it impossible for
independent stores to keep competitive inventories; and (3) even in a
fragmented industry and even where the merger results in control of a
small share of a particular market, the fact that the merged entity is a
chain can adversely affect competition.79 Citing evidence from
independent retailers, the Court found these factors to be present in the
Brown-Kinney merger.80
Third, and most baffling, the Court found that as a result of the
merger, Kinney could purchase shoes manufactured by Brown more
cheaply than could rivals and that the savings realized from Brown
purchases would give Kinney a competitive leg-up.81 The Court
recognized the potential benefits to consumers in the form of lower
74. Id. at 297.
75. Id. at 345–46.
76. Id. at 343. The combined share that would exceed 5% applied to only one relevant line of
commerce. Id.
77. Id. at 343 (“In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the control of substantial shares
of the trade in a city may have important effects on competition.”).
78. Id. at 343–44.
79. Id. at 344.
80. Id. at 344–46.
81. Id. at 343–44 (“The retail outlets of independent companies, by eliminating wholesalers
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can
market their own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers.”).
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prices that would flow from the mergers of two large integrated chain
operations, such as Brown and Kinney, and that mergers should not be
condemned solely because small independent stores may be adversely
affected. The Court, nevertheless, reasoned that potential cost savings
to Kinney that would give it a leg up over rivals were reason enough to
condemn the merger:82
But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.83

In other words, the merger was condemned because of the
efficiencies that it was likely to produce. For that reason, the critics
have pilloried Brown Shoe.84 Indeed, the Court’s statement that
antitrust law was meant to protect competition, not competitors, but that
the merger still must be condemned because it adversely affects
competitors embodies what Robert Bork has termed the antitrust
paradox.85 Still, Brown Shoe has never been overruled, and it set the
tone for the Court’s hostile attitude toward mergers throughout the
1960s.
Thereafter, in Philadelphia National Bank, the Court struck down the
merger of the second and third largest commercial banks in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area.86 The merged entity would have been
the largest commercial bank in Philadelphia with 30% of the market.87
The top two banks would have controlled 59% of the market, and the

82. Id. at 344 (noting that Congress sought to protect small businesses by promoting
competition for small businesses that would surely suffer from competitors marketing their own
brands at lower prices).
83. Id.
84. See BORK, supra note 15, at 210–15 (explaining why Brown Shoe has received such harsh
criticism).
85. Id. at 216 (“No matter how many times you read it, that passage states: although mergers
are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely
affected, we must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small independent stores may be
adversely affected.”).
86. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (holding that “the merger of
[the companies] would violate [section 7 of the Clayton Act]” and rejecting the notion that
applying the procompetitive policy of section 7 to the banking industry would have “dire”
consequences for the economy).
87. Id. at 364 (“The merger of appellees will result in a single bank’s controlling at least 30%
of the commercial banking business in the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area.”).
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top four would have controlled 78%.88 The Court ruled that a merger
creating: (1) an undue percentage share of the market (presumably a
share greater than 30%); and (2) a significant increase in concentration
(here the concentration ratio of the two largest firms increased from
44% to 59%) was presumptively unlawful.89 The burden then shifted to
the merged entity to justify the merger. 90 Here, the Court rejected all
arguments favoring the merger.91 In particular, the Court rejected
PNB’s countervailing economic power argument—that an entity of its
size was needed to compete with the large New York City-based
banks.92 After pointing out that the largest New York City bank had
more assets than all of the Philadelphia banks combined, the Court
rejected the argument that “anticompetitive effects in one market could
be justified by procompetitive consequences in another.”93 Similarly,
the Court eschewed PNB’s claim that the merger would spur economic
development, concluding that a merger could not be saved by the fact
that it may have been beneficial.94 Congress was aware of the possible
economies to be attained by mergers but was determined “to preserve
our traditionally competitive economy.”95
In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court left the door open a crack
for horizontal mergers but later seemed to slam the door shut in Von’s
Grocery.96 That case involved the merger of two Los Angeles area
grocery chains where one firm had a 4.7% share of the market and the
other 2.8%.97 The Court struck down this merger, which created an
entity with 7.5% of sales in the relevant market, after finding that: (1)
there was a marked trend in concentration in the grocery store business,

88. Id. at 331.
89. Id. at 363 (noting the Court’s inability to find anticompetitive effects in the merger).
90. Id. at 366–67 (“There is nothing in the record of this case to rebut the inherently
anticompetitive tendency manifested by these percentages.”).
91. Id. at 370–72 (explaining why all the merger justifications were inapplicable).
92. Id. at 370–71 (“This is a case, plainly, where two small firms in a market propose to merge
in order to be able to compete more successfully with the leading firms in that market.”).
93. Id. at 370.
94. Id. at 371 (“We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which ‘may be substantially
to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic
debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”).
95. Id. at 371.
96. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“The harsh standard now applied by the Court to horizontal mergers may prejudice irrevocably
the already difficult choice faced by numerous small and medium-sized businessmen in the
myriad smaller markets where the effect of today’s decision will be felt . . . .”).
97. Id. at 272 (noting that the companies’ sales together were 7.5% of the total retail grocery
sales in Los Angeles).
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with individually owned stores declining by nearly 50% from 5365 to
3580 between 1950 and 1961; (2) in the same period, food chains had
increased from ninety-six to 150; and (3) nine of the top twenty chains
had acquired 126 stores in that period.98
The Court in Von’s Grocery made no effort to appraise the
anticompetitive effects of the merger in terms of the contemporary
economy of the Los Angeles food industry and seemed blind to the fact
that the world had changed. Consumers preferred the convenience,
choice and cost-savings of supermarkets; Mom and Pop grocery stores
were fast becoming extinct. Frustrated with the lack of economic
analysis in Von’s Grocery and its predecessors, dissenting Justice Potter
Stewart opined that “[t]he sole consistency that I can find [in Supreme
Court merger pronouncements] is that in litigation under [section] 7, the
Not surprisingly, Von’s Grocery
Government always wins.”99
effectively sounded the death knell for horizontal mergers for well over
a decade. In the wake of that decision—where a merger between two
rivals with less than 5% of the market was struck down—horizontal
mergers were, as a practical matter, per se unlawful.
B. Rise of the Chicago School (1977–1992)
The 1970s marked the ascendancy of the Chicago School of thought
as the predominant mode of antitrust analysis and policy-making. The
Chicago School holds that “allocative efficiency as defined by the
market should be the only goal of the antitrust laws.”100 The Chicago
School analysis is rooted in two fundamental assumptions of
neoclassical economics: (1) markets are self-correcting; and (2) firms
and consumers are rational actors and generally act as profitmaximizers.101 The neoclassic model, in turn, serves two interrelated
functions. First, it provides the basic economic assumptions—the
organizing principles—for modern antitrust analysis.102 Second, the
neoclassical model may be proffered in place of facts as proof of
competitive effects of certain conduct, rather than simply as
confirmation of existing factual evidence.103 The Chicago School has

98. Id. at 277–81 (giving reasons for striking the merger).
99. Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215 (1985).
101. Rosch, supra note 14, at 7–8.
102. Id. at 13 (“[The] neoclassical analysis still provides the only organizing principle that we
can use.”).
103. Id. at 9 (“[N]eoclassical economic models are sometimes offered as a substitute for
empirical evidence of the effects that a practice or transaction may have instead of simply
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had a profound effect on antitrust analysis—most significantly, it has
emboldened courts to “ramble through the wilds of economic theory” in
an effort to reach good outcomes.104
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Chicago School adherents agree that horizontal agreements affecting
price are pernicious and should be condemned out of hand.105 The
infusion of economic thought has impacted the development of antitrust
law across the board, but has been most influential in the area of vertical
restraints. As discussed above, the early decisions involving vertical
restraints mirrored those involving horizontal restraints.106 Price-fixing
among competitors and horizontal division of markets were condemned
as per se unlawful because the courts understood that: (1) these
restraints misallocated resources, thereby creating waste, leading to
higher prices and lower output; and (2) any benefits arising from such
restraints were speculative and at best marginal and hence not worth any
effort to quantify.107 The courts then subjected vertically imposed price
restraints and vertically imposed territorial restraints to similar per se
condemnation, but without any compelling rationale.108 Indeed, the
early decisions on vertical restraints failed to appreciate the fundamental
differences in horizontal and vertical restraints.
A close look at how the market for retail sales operates illustrates
these differences. Calvin Klein and Ralph Lauren are competitors in the
clothing industry. It is only natural that Ralph Lauren would seek to
outsell Calvin Klein and reap substantially higher profits. If Calvin
Klein and Ralph Lauren were cooperating instead of trying to outsell
each other, their conduct would be suspicious.
corroborating that empirical evidence.”).
104. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
105. See BORK, supra note 15, at 263 (“The law’s oldest and, properly qualified, most
valuable rule states that it is illegal per se for competitors to agree to limit rivalry among
themselves.”).
106. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (acknowledging that initial developments
in vertical restraint decisions closely mirrored horizontal restraint decisions).
107. See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 n.16 (1990)
(“‘[P]rice fixing cartels are condemned per se because the conduct is tempting to businessmen but
very dangerous to society. The conceivable social benefits are few in principle, small in
magnitude, speculative in occurrence, and always premised on the existence of price-fixing power
which is likely to be exercised adversely to the public.’” (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW 412–13 (1986)).
108. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (recognizing that courts held resale price
maintenance and vertically imposed territorial restraints per se unlawful, mirroring developments
in horizontal laws).
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This situation is fundamentally different, however, in the vertical
arena. For example, Ralph Lauren sells to Saks, and Saks sells to
consumers. Ralph Lauren and Saks are not rivals. Ralph Lauren needs
Saks to get its goods to consumers. Therefore, one would not be
surprised to see some cooperation between manufacturer and retailer.
Such cooperation would not necessarily stymie competition in the way
that horizontal agreements would. Cooperation among competitors
would encourage output limitations in order to support higher prices.
The incentives in the vertical area differ markedly. Suppose, for
example, Ralph Lauren imposes a location clause on Saks and allows
Saks to sell Ralph Lauren goods only from its New York stores. Here,
Ralph Lauren would have no incentive to limit the volume of sales to
Saks. To the contrary, Ralph Lauren would want to sell as much as
possible to Saks. Limiting sales to Saks would not enable Ralph Lauren
to elevate price levels. Simply put, vertically imposed territorial
restraints do not invariably lead to higher prices and lower output.
More importantly, as the Supreme Court recognized in GTE/Sylvania,
there are significant economic reasons for a manufacturer to impose
territorial restraints on its sellers.109 Relying heavily on the economics
literature, the Court observed that territorial restraints can promote
inter-brand competition by, inter alia, minimizing free riding, creating
efficiencies in distribution and encouraging retailers to promote the
manufacturer’s products.110 Accordingly, vertically imposed territorial
restraints are not invariably anticompetitive and must be judged on a
case-by-case basis.111 Three decades later, in Leegin, the Supreme
Court extended the rationale of GTE/Sylvania to cover vertically
imposed price restraints, abandoning the per se rule in retail price
maintenance cases.112
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In the area of monopolization, Chicagoans are generally noninterventionists. Professor Jonathan Baker has ably summarized their
arguments against monopolization enforcement: (1) Markets are selfcorrecting; (2) monopoly fosters economic growth; (3) there is but a
109. Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–56 (1977) (noting, for example,
that vertical restraints reduce intrabrand competition and promote interbrand competition).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 58–59 (overruling Schwinn’s per se illegality rule).
112. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916–17 (2007)
(seeking to modify per se rules, reasoning that scholars have been unable to identify with
specificity anticompetitive harms).
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single monopoly profit and therefore cannot extract additional
monopoly profits from related markets; (4) exclusion of fringe rivals by
a monopolist is not likely to create significant adverse competitive
consequences; (5) courts have difficulty in both identifying and
remedying monopolization and cannot effectively regulate
monopolization; and (6) section 2 litigation is often misused by
unsuccessful rivals who have lost out in the marketplace and now seek
refuge in the courts.113
One area of disagreement among Chicagoans with respect to
monopolization is the treatment of predatory pricing.
Judge
Easterbrook would opt for a rule of per se legality because lower prices
almost always benefit consumers.114 Judge Posner, on the other hand,
would challenge below-cost pricing where that conduct would eliminate
an equally efficient competitor from the field.115
However, perhaps the most important development in antitrust
jurisprudence in the Chicago School era—the modern approach to
predatory pricing—was not decided in Chicago, having originated with
Harvard’s Areeda and Turner. Areeda and Turner developed objective
standards for determining whether a dominant seller’s pricing practices
were predatory and hence unlawful under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Courts have been traditionally suspicious of dominant firms but, at the
same time, have recognized that the law cannot condemn those who
have gotten big by playing within the rules. Richard Steuer has aptly
described predatory pricing as “bullying,”116 and courts have had
difficulty distinguishing when price cuts by dominant firms are lawful
competitive tools and when they constitute an abuse of dominance. The
early predatory pricing cases focused largely on subjective factors; for
example, did the defendant intend to drive a rival from the field?117

113. Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the NonInterventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 616–18
(2010) (summarizing non-interventionist arguments).
114. Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 267 (1981) (recognizing “the general agreement that almost all price reductions, sales
increases, additions to capacity, and so on[,] are beneficial”).
115. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194–95 (2d ed.
2001); see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 927 (1979) (“Selling below cost in order to drive out a competitor is unprofitable even in the
long run . . . .”).
116. See Steuer, supra note 1, at 543.
117. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702–03 (1967) (focusing on
predatory intent), impliedly overruled by Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221–23 (1993).
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That subjective standard has now proven to be neither wise nor
administrable.
First, anticompetitive intent involves state of mind and is difficult to
prove.118 Second, the test is over-inclusive. In a competitive
environment, it is only natural that a seller would wish to drive rivals
from the field.119 That is what true competition is all about—winning.
Statements to the effect that a seller wishes to “crush” rivals or drive
rivals out of business can reflect the desire to compete aside from any
predatory intent and therefore are not particularly probative of predatory
behavior.120 Third, price reductions, even price reduction by dominant
firms, are generally beneficial to consumers, and an overly broad
prohibition of price cuts by dominant firms is likely to chill
procompetitive behavior.121 Fourth, a subjective standard is simply too
difficult for courts to administer fairly, consistently, and efficiently.122
In the 1970s, Professors Areeda and Turner argued that the focus on
subjective intent in alleged predation cases was misguided and
suggested an objective, cost-based standard. In their view, predatory
pricing rarely occurred and was even more rarely successful. 123 Areeda
and Turner proposed bright-line, cost-based rules to identify truly
predatory pricing behavior.124 Prices above a firm’s marginal cost were
viewed as per se lawful, and prices below marginal costs were per se

118. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983)
(“‘[I]ntent to harm’ without more offers too vague a standard in a world where executives may
think no further than ‘[l]et’s get more business,’ and long-term effects on consumers depend in
large measure on competitors’ responses.”).
119. See A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[I]ntent is not a basis of liability (or a ground for inferring the existence of such a basis) in a
predatory pricing case under the Sherman Act.”).
120. Olympic Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F. 2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“[I]f conduct is not objectively anticompetitive[,] the fact that it was motivated by hostility to
competitors . . . is irrelevant.”).
121. See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (“[C]onsumers gain the most when firms slash
costs to the bone and pare price down to cost . . . .”).
122. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. at 225–27 (noting the difficulties in
making such a determination, as even evidence of below-cost pricing is not sufficient to infer
injury to competition, and even acts of pure malice by competitors are not sufficient for federal
antitrust claims).
123. Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practice Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975) (“[P]roven cases of predatory pricing
have been extremely rare.”).
124. Id. at 716 (concluding that “marginal-cost pricing is the economically sound position
between acceptable, competitive behavior and “below cost” predation, and thus suggesting “a
prohibition of prices below marginal cost”).
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illegal under the Areeda-Turner formulation.125 Recognizing the
practical difficulties involved in deriving marginal cost, they proposed
that average variable cost be used as a surrogate for marginal cost.126
This cost-based approach has been widely adopted in the lower
courts.127 In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court adopted a version of
the Areeda-Turner test, ruling that the offense of predatory pricing
requires (1) proof of pricing below a reasonable measure of cost; and
(2) proof of a dangerous probability that the seller will be able to recoup
its short term losses by exacting long term monopoly rents. 128 In so
holding, the Court did not hold that marginal cost or average variable
cost would be the exclusive measure of cost in predatory cases, nor did
it rule out some other measure of cost as appropriate in a given case.129
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
As discussed above, the courts in the wake of Brown Shoe were
decidedly hostile to mergers.130
Two events brought about a
fundamental reshaping of the merger landscape cultivated by the
Supreme Court in the 1960s: (1) the enactment in 1976 of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (“HSR Act”);131 and (2) the
promulgation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines by the Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).132 As a result, mergers are
now reviewed administratively, and very few mergers come before the
courts. Accordingly, the hostile case law that evolved in the 1960s is
largely irrelevant.
a. Hart-Scott-Rodino
The HSR Act required parties to a merger of any real size, prior to
125. Id. at 709 (“[W]e conclude that a price at or above average cost should be deemed nonpredatory, and not in law exclusionary, whether permanent or not.”).
126. Id. at 716–18 (arguing that average variable cost is a useful indicator of marginal cost,
despite the fact that the two may ultimately differ from one another).
127. See, e.g., Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976).
128. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993)
(“[E]vidence of below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable
recoupment and injury to competition. Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is
likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the
scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.”).
129. See id. at 222–24.
130. See notes 76–93 and accompanying text.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
132. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/
11248.pdf.
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consummating their deal, to notify (confidentially) the Antitrust
Division and the FTC of the proposed merger.133 Once the agencies are
notified, the merger may not be consummated for at least thirty days,
unless the government grants an early termination of the waiting
period.134 Prior to the HSR Act, the government generally would be
unaware of a given merger until after it had been consummated and had
become public. A principal aim of the HSR Act was to give enforcers
the opportunity to review (and possibly challenge) a merger before it
had been effectuated. It is far easier to challenge a merger before it
occurs; once a merger takes hold, trying to undo that merger is a bit like
untying a pretzel.
During the thirty-day HSR waiting period, the reviewing agency may
decide that no enforcement action is appropriate or may choose to
challenge the merger.135 The vast majority of HSR investigations are
terminated without enforcement action.136 In some instances, the
reviewing agency may make a “second request” for additional
information.137 The response to the second request may lead to
challenge to the transaction by the agency. Usually, the agency will
identify what it deems to be the anticompetitive aspects and how the
merging parties can address the problem by, for example, spinning off
certain holdings. If the merging parties agree, they will enter into a
consent decree, and the transaction will go forward as modified by the
consent decree.138 Thus, mergers are rarely challenged in the judicial
arena.
The end result of the HSR process is that merger practice is now
handled administratively by the agencies and not judicially by the
courts. Indeed, there has not been a substantive merger case decided by
the Supreme Court since the General Dynamics139 case in 1974, which
predated the HSR Act by two years.

133. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a).
134. Id. § 18a(b).
135. Id. § 18a(b)(2), (f).
136. For example, in the 2012 Fiscal Year, the Agencies challenged only forty-four of 1429
reported transactions (3%). See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & F.T.C., HART-SCOTT-RODINO
ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012 2–3 (2013).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e).
138. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
401–12 (Jonathan I. Gleklen, et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter ALD VII].
139. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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b. The 1982 Merger Guidelines
The 1982 Merger Guidelines, jointly issued by the Antitrust Division
and FTC, also had a profound effect on modern merger analysis. The
Guidelines were intended to: (1) reduce any uncertainty surrounding the
evaluation of mergers by providing an analytical roadmap to merger
enforcement; and (2) bring the merger enforcement policies of the
1960s in line with subsequent developments in antitrust law and
economics.140 The unifying theme of the 1982 Guidelines is that only
those mergers that create or enhance market power should be challenged
under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The 1982 Guidelines evaluate
mergers based on the protection and enhancement of economic
efficiency, and not based on socio-political concerns. To that end, the
1982 Guidelines set forth a rigorous, step-by-step economic analysis of
mergers:
1. Define relevant product and geographic markets.
2. Identify all participants in that market.
3. Determine each participant’s share of the relevant product
market.
4. Determine market concentration in the post-merger market.
5. Determine the change in market concentration as a result of the
merger.
6. View the post-merger market concentration and change in
concentration against standards set forth in the Guidelines.
7. Analyze the competitive effects of the merger.
8. Analyze other factors, such as entry, that might mitigate or
enhance anticompetitive effects.
9. Determine whether the failing company defense applies.141
A major innovation of the Guidelines was the introduction of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) as the tool to measure market
concentration. HHI analysis works as follows: (1) all participants in the
relevant market are identified; (2) the percentage share of the market of
each participant is determined; (3) the market share of each participant
is then squared; and (4) the squared market shares are then summed.
The reason for squaring market shares under HHI analysis is that in
140. William E. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 618, 618 (1983) (discussing the Department of Justice’s goals in updating the Merger
Guidelines).
141. See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 132 (outlining the enforcement policy
concerning mergers and acquisitions according to section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of
the Sherman Act).
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doing so, differences in relative size of the market participants are taken
into account. Thus, using HHI analysis, there would be greater
competitive concern in a five-entity market where the market shares are
60, 20, 10, 7, and 3 than where each company has 20% of the market.
The Merger Guidelines have been updated from time to time, most
recently in 2010.142 The Merger Guidelines have been widely hailed for
the intellectual rigor they bring to the merger review process, an
element notably lacking in the 1960s merger case law.143 On the other
hand, the Merger Guidelines have been subject to criticism.144 As more
fully discussed below,145 one major criticism is that the enforcement
agencies have not always applied the Guidelines as written; that is,
enforcement agencies have chosen not to prosecute cases that the
Guidelines suggest should be pursued.146 The end result is that very
few mergers have been challenged administratively and even fewer in
the courts.
III.WHERE ECONOMICS HAS FAILED ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
A. Mergers
Reliance on economic evidence has proved troublesome in antitrust
analysis in at least four respects. First, the influx of economic theory in
mergers analysis has unduly complicated the process and, at times, led
to counterintuitive results. Second, in indirect purchaser cases, the use
of economic theory to trace overcharges through the chain of
distribution has not only complicated proceedings but also led to
speculative outcomes. Third, economic theory has been introduced in
class action certification analysis and transformed certification
proceedings into complex mini trials. Fourth, and perhaps most
important, lower courts are using economic theory to fill the gaps in the
evidentiary record, and, at times, are accepting as true theoretical

142. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
23–24 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES] (discussing innovation and product
variety), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf; see also infra
notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
143. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 53 (2010) (“[T]he 1982 Guidelines were a dramatic step forward in
merger enforcement policy . . . .”).
144. Id. at 65.
145. See infra notes 168–76 and accompanying text (acknowledging the refusal to follow
guidelines).
146. See Shapiro, supra note 143, at 57–58 (“A consistent theme running through the panels is
that there are indeed gaps between the Guidelines and actual agency practice . . . .”).
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propositions that are contrary to the actual proof in a given case.
Unquestionably, the 1982 Merger Guidelines were a step forward in
merger analysis. The Guidelines required a rigorous assessment of the
likely economic effects of the merger rather than the blanket
presumptions utilized by the courts in the 1960s. Those presumptions,
based on market structure and trends in concentration effectively
rendered most horizontal mergers unlawful. The 1982 Guidelines,
however, brought with them their own set of problems. First, the
Guidelines’ rigid requirement that relevant product and geographic
markets be defined at the outset of the analysis permitted mergers that
should have been challenged to slip through the net. Second, the 1982
Guidelines were rarely enforced as written and numerous mergers went
unchallenged when the Guidelines explicitly called for challenge.
Third, thoughtful attempts to revise the Guidelines in 2010 have
further—and unnecessarily—complicated merger analysis.
1. Market Definition
The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe ruled that market definition is a
“necessary predicate” to any determination of the legality of a
merger.147 The 1982 Merger Guidelines embraced this approach and
required, as an initial step in merger analysis, that relevant product and
geographic markets be identified. Inevitably, the market definition
exercise overshadowed the rest of the merger analysis process. Once
relevant markets were defined, the outcomes were essentially dictated.
Merger assessments would begin and often end at the market definition
stage.
The analytical error here is the notion that relevant markets actually
exist when in fact, they do not. The concept of a relevant market is an
artificial construct. As the late Professor Lawrence Sullivan noted,
“[E]conomic relationships are seldom so simple that a relevant market
can be defined with exactitude and confidence. There is not for any
product, a single real ‘market’ waiting to be discovered.”148
Similarly, Donald Baker has underscored the arbitrary nature of
market definition, calling relevant market “a magic grouping of
transactions around which a circle is drawn” and noting that “[u]nder
traditional approaches the circle is impermeable—everything inside is
fully counted, and everything outside is ignored.”149 Indeed, Professor
147. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
148. LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 41 (1st ed. 1977).
149. Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71
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Kaplow has argued that the practice of defining relevant markets
“should be abandoned” because there is no “coherent way to choose a
relevant market without first formulating one’s best assessment of
market power, whereas the entire rationale for the market definition
process is to enable an inference about market power.”150
In truth, the market definition exercise is as much art as it is science.
But the 1982 Guidelines approached the issue with the view that for a
given set of transactions, there is but one product market and one
geographic market.151 The outcomes that emerge from this reasoning
can be counter-intuitive. The XM-Sirius merger in 2008 is a prime
example of this phenomenon. XM and Sirius, the only two providers of
satellite radio services, agreed to merge. On its face, this appears to be
a merger to monopoly, a clear violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Antitrust Division, however, saw the matter differently. Accepting
the broader market definitions proffered by the merging parties, it
rejected a satellite radio market, in favor of the “mass-market retail
channel” which would include AM/FM radio, HD radio, MP3 players,
and audio offerings delivered through wireless telephones.152 That
rather Procrustean market definition ignores the common sense reality
that where there were once two satellite radio providers, there is now
one: a merger to monopoly.153
Market definition is not an end in itself under the antitrust laws,154

CALIF. L. REV. 311, 326 (1983).
150. Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010). But
cf. Gregory Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 729–30 (2013) (arguing that market definition serves “important purposes,
other than inferring market power” and that the “quantitative tools of modern economics often
must be supported by delineating the relevant market”).
151. See Carla A. Hills et al., Panel Discussion: The New Merger Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST
L.J. 317, 321 (1982) (reproducing remarks of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General,
stating that the concept of the submarket “has been terribly abused” and that “[i]f the question
means [the future of] ‘submarkets’. . . then my answer would be[,] the sooner we see the end of
that kind of chatter the better.”).
152. See Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its
Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.
(March 24, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226 html [hereinafter DOJ
Closing Statement on XM-Sirius Merger].
153. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (describing the process of creating a monopoly).
154. See Kaplow, supra note 150, at 443 (“It is uncontroversial that the core rationale for
defining and redefining markets is to enable inferences about market power.”); id. at 467 (“[T]he
raison d’être for the market definition enterprise is to provide a basis for inferring market
power.”); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 148, at 41. But see Werden, supra note 150, at 731
(“But the relevant market does serve other important analytic purposes.”); cf. F.T.C. v. Whole
Foods Mkt., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[M]easuring market power is not the only
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but simply an analytical construct used to compensate for the inability
to measure market power directly. 155 Anticompetitive effect should be
the principal focus of merger analysis. 156 The Supreme Court has long
recognized that “the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and
market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential
for genuine adverse effect on competition” and that “‘proof of actual
detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output’ can obviate the need
for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for
detrimental effects.’”157 Accordingly, “the finding of actual, sustained
adverse effects on competition . . . is legally sufficient to support a
finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the
absence of elaborate market analysis.”158 The Court has never insisted
on market analysis in per se cases under the Sherman Act. In NCAA,159
the Court, although eschewing per se analysis, categorically rejected the
defense that the NCAA lacked market power, ruling that “[a]s a matter
of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked
restriction on price or output . . . .”160 The NCAA Court further
observed that where price and supply are not responsive to consumer
preference, “[w]e have never required proof of market power.”161
Similarly, in monopolization cases arising under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, market definition is unnecessary where plaintiff can
adduce actual evidence of anticompetitive effect. Thus in Image
Technical Services,162 the Supreme Court found that evidence proffered
by plaintiffs that Kodak forced consumers to pay higher prices for
inferior Kodak maintenance services was evidence of market power
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.163
2. Failure to Enforce the Guidelines as Written
A second problem with the Guidelines was the fact that the
regulatory agencies did not enforce the Guidelines as written.164 Again,
purpose of market definition . . . .”).
155. SULLIVAN, supra note 148, at 41; Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 149, at 323.
156. SULLIVAN, supra note 148, at 41.
157. F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 461.
159. N.C.A.A. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
160. Id. at 86.
161. Id. at 110.
162. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
163. Id. at 465.
164. See Shapiro, supra note 143, at 57–58 (“A consistent theme running through the panels is
that there are indeed gaps between the Guidelines and actual agency practice—gaps in the sense
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the XM-Sirius merger illustrates the situation.165 The Antitrust
Division decided not to challenge the merger in part because it
concluded that any competitive concerns would be outweighed by the
efficiencies generated by the merger and the likelihood that new
technologies would be developed to provide improved alternatives to
satellite radio.166 In approving the merger, the Antitrust Division
conceded that it was unable to quantify or even estimate the magnitude
of any efficiencies, even though the Guidelines themselves required that
efficiencies offered to justify a transaction must be clearly identified
and merger-specific;167 the Antitrust Division did not even identify the
technology platform that would provide new or improved alternatives to
satellite radio. Yet, the merger cleared regulatory scrutiny.
Perhaps even more glaring was the consistent refusal of the agencies
to follow their own Guidelines with respect to concentration levels. The
Guidelines provided that a post-merger HHI of 1000 would fall within a
safe harbor.168 A post-merger HHI of 1000–1800 would raise
competitive concerns where there are large concentration increases but
would be unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences where
changes in concentration are small.169 In markets with post-merger
HHIs in excess of 1800, the merger would ordinarily be subject to
challenge if the change in concentration as a result of the merger was
100 or more.170
In practice, the HHI thresholds were much higher. The de facto safe
harbor was post-merger HHI of 2400 and an increase in concentration
of at least 200, with most challenges directed at HHIs that were much
higher.171 The fact is that over time, the enforcement agencies relied
of both omissions of important factors that help predict the competitive effects of mergers and
statements that are either misleading or inaccurate.”).
165. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
168. See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 132, § III.A(1)(a) (noting that the
Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in generally unconcentrated markets—those with a
post-merger HHI below 1000—because not only does section 1 of the Sherman Act provide an
adequate response to any explicit collusion that might occur, but also because implicit collusion is
likely to be inherently difficult).
169. See id. § III.A(1)(b).
170. See id. § III.A(1)(c).
171. See Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines and
the Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 2–3 (October
2010), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/a9e7f710-a9a7-4321-956b-4c4b1263
b362/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ca98abc9-a4cb-475a-a308-4fb9bbf4c8b5/Market%20
Definition,%20the%20New%20Horizontal%20Merger%20Guidelines,%20and%20the%20Long
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less and less on structural factors and more on direct evidence of likely
price increases.172 In 1992, the Merger Guidelines were revised to
incorporate the unilateral effects doctrine as a cognizable legal basis for
challenging a merger.173 Under the unilateral effects doctrine, a merger
may be set aside where the merged entity can unilaterally raise the price
of its product, without the need to provide detailed analysis of the
competitive environment.174
At first blush, the unilateral effects doctrine appears to be a step
forward in merger enforcement. It deftly sidesteps the thorny question
of market definition and attempts to focus merger analysis directly on
price and output issues.175 It also provides an alternative to coordinated
effects as a basis for challenging a merger. At the same time unilateral
effects brings with it its own baggage. The economic debate shifts
away from market definition to the equally complex arena of diversion
ratios, which, in turn, invites introduction and debate of complicated
economic theory.176
Whole Foods177 is a case in point. The FTC challenged the Whole
Foods-Wild Oats merger, arguing that under a critical diversion theory,
the newly merged entity could profitably raise prices because Whole
Foods’ own documents indicated that Wild Oats customers would prefer
to shop at Whole Foods after the merger, as opposed to conventional
supermarkets.178 To counter this argument, the merging parties urged
that under the theory of critical loss analysis, marginal customers would
turn to conventional supermarkets and thereby thwart any effort by the

%20March%20Away%20from%20Struct.pdf (citing F.T.C. Horizontal Merger Investigation
Data, Fiscal Years 1996–2007, tbls. 3.1–3.6 (2008)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 71–72 and accompanying text. Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires
proof of anticompetitive effect in defined product and geographic markets. Id. Courts continue
to insist that plaintiffs follow this statutory directive and prove anticompetitive effect within
appropriately defined markets. Id. The early focus on anticompetitive effect serves to facilitate
market definition, not to eliminate it.
176. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Comment on Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission’s Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10–11 (June 4, 2010), available at
http://www ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/548050-00034.pdf (noting that the distinction
between unilateral effects and coordinated effects may be confusing to businesses and to the
courts).
177. F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In Whole Foods, the FTC
brought an action to enjoin the proposed merger of two large operators of organic supermarkets.
Id. at 1032.
178. Id. at 1038.
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newly merged entity to raise prices.179 The key difference in these
approaches was that critical loss theory depended only on loss of
marginal sales, while the FTC critical diversion analysis turned on the
average loss of customers because a “core of committed customers
would continue to shop at [Whole Foods]” despite any post-merger
price increase.180
The unilateral effects theory may well be a step forward in merger
control, but even under this approach, the courts are immersed in
complex economic analysis. The theory simply substitutes one form of
economic complexity for another.
3. 2010 Guidelines
In 2010, the Justice Department and FTC promulgated a major
revision of the Merger Guidelines.181 The overarching goal of the 2010
revision was to bring the Guidelines in line with actual practice of the
agencies.182 To that end, the thresholds for safe harbors and
presumptive challenges were revised significantly.183 In addition, the
new Guidelines abandon the stepwise approach employed in earlier
versions that began with market definition.184 In part, this change
recognized that market definition, while not unimportant, had been
given too big a role in merger analysis and had led to counterintuitive
results.185 Accordingly, anticompetitive effect is the principal focus of
merger analysis.186 By bringing the Guidelines into sync with actual
agency practice, the 2010 revisions are an important step forward.187
The new approach embodied in the 2010 Guidelines, however,
creates problems of its own. In an effort to tap into the most recent
thinking on likely anti-competitive effect of mergers, the Guidelines
incorporate terminology and sophisticated economic analysis
understood only by expert economists and foreign-to-corporate

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
182. See Garza, supra note 171, at 5 (“The 2010 Guidelines thus better reflect how the
agencies actually assess mergers.”).
183. Id. at 4 (“The 1000 HHI safe harbor has become 1500 and the 1800 threshold has
become more than 2500 . . . .”).
184. Id.
185. See Shapiro, supra note 143, at 56 (“The revised Guidelines emphasize that merger
analysis ultimately is about competitive effects.”).
186. Id.
187. Id.

2013]

Antitrust Law and Economic Theory

155

decision-makers, lawyers, and judges. The outcome turns on which of
the dueling experts the finder of fact ultimately chooses to believe. The
experts, in turn, analyze facts, invoke presumptions, spin out theory, and
develop econometric models that they urge can predict market behavior.
All of this comes at a huge cost to the parties and introduces both
complexities and a heavy dose of terminological clutter into the merger
review process. As two respected antitrust commentators recently
observed:
Throughout the customary antitrust investigation, and especially at
trial, the economists’ expert opinions and the economic theories and
models that buttress the competing opinions take center stage.
However, even for counsel who are experienced in the practice of
antitrust jurisprudence, an economist’s expert opinion is oftentimes
convoluted or difficult to follow. Generally, the economist’s opinion
will rely on empirical evidence and interpret available quantitative
data. In merger cases, economists will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) to measure competitive effects, and rely on models,
including the GUPPI (Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index), the
newly discovered vGUPPI (Verical GUPPI), diversion ratios, SSNIPs,
and Bertrand behavior, etc.
Somewhat more evolved than the popular freshwater aquarium fish
species, GUPPIs forecast post-merger effects by scoring the merger’s
predicted upward pricing pressure based on an economic model.
While this tool and others like it are certainly sophisticated, they can
obfuscate and overcomplicate matters over the course of a case.
Further compounding the problem is the overwhelming menu of
economic suppositions and schools of ideology to which economists
subscribe and on which economists base their opinions. The difficulty
of using the arsenal of today’s advanced economic weaponry is
exacerbated by the fact that judges, lawyers and juries often lack the
training, judgment, and experience necessary to decide which of the
competing economic opinions to credit.188

As the heavy lifting in merger cases has been ceded to economists,
the role of the courts has diminished.

188. Shepard Goldfein & Neal R. Stoll, Back to Basics: The (Over) Use of Economic Models
in Antitrust, ANTITRUST WRITING AWARDS & RANKING (July 11, 2012),
http://awards.concurrences.com/academic-articles-awards/article/back-to-basics-the-over-use-of
(citations omitted).
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B. Illinois Brick
In its 1977 decision in Illinois Brick,189 the United States Supreme
Court held that only those who purchased directly from antitrust
violators—and not others in the chain of distribution—are “injured”
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act, thereby barring
claims of indirect purchasers.190 Although the Court recognized that
indirect purchasers may well have had overcharges passed on to them
and thus suffered injury, the Court ultimately concluded that tracing
overcharges through the chain of distribution would unduly complicate
antitrust trials and ultimately impair private enforcement.191 It also
expressed a reluctance to transform the courtroom into an economics
classroom.192 The decision set off a storm of protests, but attempts to
persuade Congress to overrule Illinois Brick failed. Anti-Illinois Brick
forces then turned to state legislatures and had some success in
legitimizing indirect purchaser suits under state laws.193
Nevertheless, some state-based indirect purchaser suits, such as
California v. ARC America Corp.,194 found their way into federal court
either through diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. These cases posed
a unique challenge to the federal courts. Given the Supreme Court’s
unequivocal holding in Illinois Brick that federal courts were illequipped to trace overcharges through the distribution chain under
federal law, were the federal courts similarly barred from hearing
indirect purchaser claims under state law, notably where state law is
essentially identical to federal law? Subsequently, the Supreme Court
in ARC America held that antitrust federalism would permit federal
courts to entertain these state claims, Illinois Brick notwithstanding.195
Still, no court has come to grips with the fundamental objection
voiced by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick to indirect purchaser
claims—the impossibility of re-creating price/output decisions in the
courtroom. Allowing recovery for indirect purchasers is an exercise not

189. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Illinois Brick involved an action by the
State of Illinois, brought against local government entities, alleging that certain concrete block
manufactures had engaged in price-fixing. Id. at 726–27.
190. Id. at 735–36.
191. Id. at 731–35.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 340 (McKinney 2012) (permitting indirect
purchasers to sue under New York’s Donnelly Act).
194. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (involving class actions against
various cement producers alleging conspiracy to fix cement prices).
195. Id. at 101–02.
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in fact-finding but rather in rough justice.196 That rough justice can be
achieved, however, only after accepting a dizzying array of economic
assumptions spun by experts, including the dubious assumption that
middlemen routinely pass on to their customers all, or substantially all,
of any overcharges incurred. Such attempts at approximation cross the
line separating reasonable estimation from speculation, which courts
have traditionally eschewed. The better economic view of indirect
purchaser cases is that the cost of proving recovery outweighs any
benefits that accrue to indirect purchasers-plaintiffs.
C. Class Actions
Economic analysis has played an increasingly important role in class
certification analysis.197 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure sets forth detailed criteria for class certification.198 Under
Rule 23(a), the moving party must establish numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation.199 In addition, Rule 23(b)
provides that once each of the elements of Rule 23(a) have been met,
the movant must show that failure to certify a class increases the
likelihood of inconsistent rules;200 that class certification is necessary to
obtain effective injunctive relief;201 or that common questions of law or
fact predominate over individual questions.202
Since Rule 23(b)(3) was amended in 1966 to broaden the availability
of class actions, the vast majority of certification applications have been
made under this Rule.203 The Rule 23(b)(3) criteria are simple: (1) that
common questions of law or fact “predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members,” and (2) that the “class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
196. William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification in the
Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 18 (1999) (“In contrast to the skeptical account of
the problem of passing on, the sanguine view, typified by the Illinois Brick dissent, values
compensation over deterrence; equity over efficiency, and approximation over accuracy.”).
197. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013) (reversing grant of
class certification where trial court refused to entertain arguments by defendant challenging
damages model of plaintiffs’ economic expert).
198. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
201. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
203. J. Douglas Richards & Ben Brown, Predominance of Common Questions – Common
Mistakes in Applying the Class Action Standards, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 163, 163 (2009) (“For various
reasons, . . . almost all federal class actions seeking damages must proceed under Rule 23(b)(3),
pursuant to which a predominance of common questions must be established.”).
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adjudicating the controversy.”204 Yet, the courts have encountered
difficulties applying this standard.
Class actions have always been controversial,205 but today they face
unprecedented scrutiny in the courts.206 Concerned that the grant of
certification itself puts the defendant in a position where it is forced into
high-stakes litigation to settle a case irrespective of the underlying
merits, courts have insisted on “rigorous analysis” of class issues at the
certification stage.207 In undertaking this rigorous analysis, courts now
feel free to examine merits issues at the class certification stage, thereby
crossing a once impenetrable divide.208 Now that merits issues are in
play at the certification stage, parties have significant incentives to use
that phase as a vehicle to preview their cases for the courts. Yet, the
appellate courts have provided little guidance on how far the trial courts
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
205. As the Second Circuit pointed out:
Class actions, termed by some as “lawyer’s lawsuits”, see Developments in the Law—
Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1605 (1976), have received a good deal of
criticism; and much of this has been directed at the substantial fees awarded to class
attorneys. See, e.g., Alpine Pharm., Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F. 2d 1045, 1049–
50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092, 94 S. Ct. 722, 38 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1973).
Terms such as “golden harvest of fees”, Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo,
S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), “astronomical fees”, M. Blecher, Is the Class
Action Doing the Job? (Plaintiff’s Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 366 (1972), and
“enormous fees”, comment, 54 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 598, 611 (1977), are used to describe
the allowances which often run into the millions of dollars. Critics point particularly to
over-generous applications of the equitable fund doctrine, by means of which massive
fees are awarded attorneys with too little regard for the interests of the class members.
See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F. 2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977). [Much of]
[t]his criticism . . . is justified . . . .
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F. 2d 733, 735–36 (2d Cir. 1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
206. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F. 3d 305, 310 (3d
Cir. 2008); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F. 3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008).
207. See, e.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (“[C]ertification is proper only if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F. 3d at 309 (“[D]enying or
granting class certification is often the defining moment in class actions []for it may sound the
‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of the plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle
non-meritorious claims on the part of defendants[] . . . .” (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259
F. 3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001))).
208. See, e.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (noting that a rigorous analysis “will frequently
entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim” (internal quotations omitted));
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F. 3d at 320; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 165 (1974)
(holding that merits issues cannot be resolved at the class certification stage). See generally
Joshua P. Davis & Eric Cramer, A Questionable New Standard For Class Certification In
Antitrust Cases, ANTITRUST, Fall 2011, at 31–32 (pointing out the “ambiguity and uncertainty” of
the emerging standard).
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can delve into merits evidence at the certification stage, while at the
same time licensing that practice.209
More recently, appellate courts have created additional uncertainty by
adding judicial glosses to Rule 23 that raise the bar for certification.
One such gloss is that to establish predominance, class plaintiffs must
show that all class issues are susceptible to common proof.210 A second
gloss is that certification is improper unless it can be shown that all
class members suffered common injury.211
The recent Comcast212 ruling demonstrates how the Supreme Court
has raised the bar on class certification. There, customers of a cable
television provider brought a putative class action alleging that
Comcast’s strategy of “clustering” eliminated competition and caused
supracompetitive prices in violation of the antitrust laws. 213 As a
threshold matter, the Court, endorsing the ruling below, held that to
meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must
show: (1) that antitrust impact was “capable of proof at trial through
evidence that [was] common to the class rather than to its individual
members” and (2) that the damages incurred were measurable “on a
class-wide basis” using “common methodology.”214 Reversing the
certification order, the Court held that the trial court had erred in
refusing to hear challenges to the economic model proffered by
plaintiffs’ expert simply because that inquiry would also pertain to the
merits.215 The Court further held that the model failed to establish that
damages could be measured on a class-wide basis, because it did not tie
each theory of antitrust impact to a calculation of damages.216
Certification proceedings have thus become something of a cottage
industry for expert economists. As a result, class certification
proceedings have been transformed into complex miniature trials, a

209. Davis & Cramer, supra note 208, at 31–32. Compare Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1429
(stressing that a rigorous analysis may involve examination of the merits of the underlying claim),
with Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013) (“Rule 23
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”).
210. See Richards & Brown, supra note 203, at 180–84 (arguing that some courts incorrectly
apply the predominance standard to bar class certification simply because individual issues exist,
despite the fact that Rule 23(b)(3) requires an evaluation of whether common questions do, in
fact, predominate).
211. Id. at 173.
212. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
213. Id. at 1430.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1432–33.
216. Id. at 1433.
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practice roundly condemned by the Supreme Court three decades
ago.217
Moreover, because class certification issues regarding predominance
and superiority raise essentially legal questions under Rule 23, it is not
clear whether economic evidence is either helpful or relevant to the
court’s certification decision. Under Daubert, such evidence must be
carefully vetted by the court and excluded if it does not assist the
court.218
D. Use of Economic Theory To Fill In The Gaps In Any Factual Record
As discussed above,219 neoclassic economic theory is sometimes
offered in place of facts as proof of competitive effects of certain
conduct. Two well-known antitrust cases utilizing this approach were
Trinko220 and Twombly,221 both of which involved motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On a
motion to dismiss the complaint, only the complaint is properly before
the court, unlike a motion for summary judgment where the entire
pretrial record is before the court.222 Yet, by invoking economic theory,
the Supreme Court found that neither Bell Atlantic in Trinko, nor the
defendants in Twombly, had violated the antitrust laws. Thus, in Trinko
the Court found that it was perfectly reasonable for Bell Atlantic not to
share its infrastructure because to do so “may lessen the incentive for
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically
beneficial facilities.”223 Similarly, in Twombly, the Court found that it
was “only natural” (and hence not illegal) for erstwhile regulated
monopolists not to comply with the Telecommunications Act of 1996
by making their facilities available to rivals who then would compete
with defendants in local phone service.224

217. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (noting that courts cannot
conduct preliminary inquiries into a suit to “determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action”).
218. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
219. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (commenting on the usage of economic
theory in place of fact in trials).
220. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
221. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
222. See Fletcher v. Burkhalter, 605 F.3d 1091, 1098 (10th Cir. 2010) (“There [is] no need to
review the evidence in the record, because the allegations of the complaint are deemed true on a
motion to dismiss.”).
223. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
224. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568 (“[A] natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is
that . . . monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.”).
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Using economic theory to fill gaps in the factual record on a motion
to dismiss is objectionable on at least five counts. First, it entails
assessing information outside of the complaint, the only document
properly before the court on a motion to dismiss. 225 Second, by
effectively licensing fact-finding at the motion to dismiss stage, it
usurps the function of the judge or jury at trial.226 Third, it undermines
the fundamental goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide
meritorious litigants their day in court.227 Fourth, the utility of the
neoclassical model has been called into question as both its foundational
prongs have been under attack. The collapse of financial markets in
2008 has shaken the faith of free-market economists in the concept of
self-correcting markets.228 In addition, scholarly research in the field of
behavioral economics has challenged the assumption that firms and
individuals always behave rationally as profit-maximizers.229
Neoclassical analysis emphasizes theory based on assumptions.230
225. See Fletcher, 605 F.3d at 1098 (noting that “the allegations of the complaint are deemed
true on a motion to dismiss”).
226. As Robert Rothman noted:
[I]n a particularly troubling sentence, the Court suggests that a complaint must not only
be consistent with the claim asserted, but must also exclude “more likely
explanations.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). What, exactly, does that mean? At a
minimum, it appears to be a standard that invites district court judges to dismiss cases
based on their own subjective notions of what is probably true—a determination that
apparently can be made based on events outside the four corners of the complaint. For
example, in Iqbal, the plaintiff—a Pakistani Muslim—sued numerous government
officials asserting violation of various constitutional rights, alleging that, following the
events of September 11, 2001, he was classified as a “high interest” detainee and held
in extremely harsh conditions as a matter of policy based “solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin, and for no legitimate penological reason.”
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 695). Although conceding his allegations, taken as true, are
consistent with his theory of being classified as “of high interest” based on race,
religion or national origin, the Court nonetheless found Iqbal’s allegations of
discriminatory treatment implausible . . . . Thus, Iqbal has the potential to short–circuit
the adversary process by shutting the doors of federal courthouses around the nation to
large numbers of legitimate claims based on what amounts to a district court judge’s
effectively irrefutable, subjective assessment of probable success. This is so
notwithstanding a complaint containing well–pled factual allegations that, if allowed to
proceed to discovery and proved true at trial, would authorize a jury to return a verdict
in the plaintiff’s favor.
Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009, at 2 (second
alternation in original).
227. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
228. See JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 310 (2011).
229. See Reeves, supra note 17, at 1–4.
230. Id.
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Behavioralists stress facts based on what people actually do. 231 To the
extent that courts embrace economic assumptions, where those
assumptions are at odds with the record facts, the results are inevitably
going to be suboptimal.
Fifth, when presented with an economic theory that appears logical or
even compelling, a court may be tempted to ignore the factual record.
But, economic theory that is at odds with the record facts is not
competent proof, and a court’s reliance on such economic theory could
lead to bad outcomes. In Whole Foods, as discussed,232 the merging
parties, arguing critical loss theory, asserted that marginal purchasers
would turn to conventional supermarkets and thereby thwart any effort
by the newly merged entity to raise prices. However, this theory was
inconsistent with Whole Foods’ own documents, which indicated that
customers of the now closed Wild Oats store would shop at Whole
Foods. The trial court, denying the preliminary injunction, relied on
Whole Foods’ theory, despite its inconsistency with the record facts.
The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, but the case still illustrates
the risk of accepting neoclassic economic theory as fact.
As noted above,233 the HSR Act and the promulgation of the 1982
Merger Guidelines effectively took merger enforcement out of the court
system and into the administrative realm. Lawsuits challenging mergers
today are rare. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not decided a substantive
merger case since the General Dynamics234 case in 1974.
Still, the de facto move of merger analysis from the courts to an
administrative model has not been without benefits. Merger review has
been faster and more cost-effective when done administratively.
Federal dockets would surely have become far more congested if even a
small percentage of the mergers consummated in the late 1990s found
their way into the court system.
These benefits, however, have come at a steep cost. The influx of
economics into antitrust analysis has made antitrust law in general, and
merger law in particular, less accessible, not only to the courts, but also
to businesses and consumers. Without any stream of cases flowing into
the court system, merger law has stagnated. Current enforcement

231. Id.
232. See supra notes 219–32 and accompanying text (noting the riskiness of applying
neoclassical economic theory as fact).
233. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (explaining the shift of merger
enforcement from the court system to administrative review).
234. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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policies vary significantly from Supreme Court precedents of the 1960s.
The agencies have not relied on Von’s Grocery or Brown Shoe in
decades. It may well be that Von’s Grocery and Brown Shoe are bad
merger policy and appropriately disowned by the agencies, but neither
case has been overruled by the Supreme Court. The existence of these
Supreme Court precedents, even if only technically viable, creates
confusion. Although few antitrust observers would consider Brown
Shoe good law, lower courts in significant and relatively recent merger
decisions have cited Brown Shoe favorably.235 Adding to that
confusion, Philadelphia National Bank, decided before Von’s Grocery
and after Brown Shoe, is still widely cited by the lower courts and
provides the template that most courts utilize in reviewing mergers. 236
A fundamental tenet of stare decisis is that old precedents cannot be
tested or discarded unless new cases are brought to challenge them.
This has clearly not happened under the administrative model because
there are simply too few merger cases in the judicial pipeline to
percolate up to the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, today’s businesses and consumers cannot look to the
courts for guidance on mergers. They are thus left to look to the
agencies for the best indication of the law. But, agency “law” is not as
accessible, or at least not accessible in the same way, as court-created
law. First, most reported mergers are cleared and there is no public
record detailing why a particular merger was not challenged. Second,
when an agency does challenge a merger and the matter is settled in
consent decree, the consent decree is not subject to the same kind of
detailed scrutiny by an appellate court that a trial court decision would
face. In short, those who regularly deal with the agencies on merger
matters may have a good sense for how the government might react to a
merger. Those outside that small group would not.
Nor do the 2010 Merger Guidelines foster accessibility. As noted
earlier,237 the 2010 Guidelines were intended to bring stated agency
policy in line with actual agency practices. The Guidelines now do, in
fact, more accurately reflect actual agency practice than prior iterations,
but the process of merger review remains shrouded in mystery. This is
235. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)); F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp.
1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997) (same).
236. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 167 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)).
237. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (stating the purpose of the Merger
Guidelines).
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due, in part, to the fact that the data utilized in merger review is often so
technical and so permeated with complex economic theory that it is of
little use to businesses or consumers without an expert economist to
translate.238 It is also due, in part, to the elimination of primary reliance
on market screens, which has made predictability of outcomes under to
the 2010 Guidelines more difficult.239 The recent Express ScriptsMedco merger is a case in point. Opponents of the transaction argued
that this was an unlawful three-to-two merger that would create a firm
with 80% of the relevant market.240 The FTC disagreed and chose not
to challenge the merger.241 The FTC de-emphasized structural evidence
and focused instead on bidding records, won-loss data, and the changing
competitive landscape in health care.242 The FTC concluded that these
data:
[R]evealed a competitive market for PBM services characterized by
numerous, vigorous competitors who are expanding and winning
business from traditional market leaders. The acquisition of Medco by
Express Scripts will likely not change these dynamics: the merging
parties are not particularly close competitors, the market today is not
conducive to coordinated interaction, and there is little risk of the
merged company exercising monopsony power.
Under these
circumstances, we lack a reason to believe that a violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act has occurred or is likely to occur by means of
Express Scripts’ acquisition of Medco.243

On the other hand, the agencies still focus on structural evidence
when mergers are challenged in court.244 This may well be because
section 7 of the Clayton Act would appear to require consideration of
market structure. Still, the difference in approach taken by the agencies
238. Simply put, the analysis embodied in the current iteration of the Merger Guidelines is
beyond the experience of the very people they were intended to guide, including many lawyers
and judges.
239. See Garza, supra note 171, at 4 (describing the Merger Guidelines’ departure from
market structure presumptions).
240. See Michael Cowie & Paul Denis, The Fall of Structural Evidence in FTC and DOJ
Merger Review, ANTITRUST SOURCE, February 2013, at 1, available at http://www.dechert.com
/files/Publication/190dc1bc-0a1d-4106-9dc0-50c32ba4b159/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
f930b680-57ae-461c-a066-64f56216fd78/the%20fall%20of%20structural%20evidence%20in%
20FTC.pdf.
241. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning the Proposed Acquisition of
Medco Health Solutions by Express Scripts, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 111-0210 (Apr. 2, 2012),
www ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120402expressmedcostatement.pdf [hereinafter FTC Closing
Statement].
242. See Cowie, supra note 240, at 2 (noting the FTC’s departure from structural evidence).
243. FTC Closing Statement, supra note 241.
244. Cowie, supra note 240, at 10.
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based on whether the forum is administrative or judicial undermines
predictability and consistency of outcomes.
Nor are the problems of accessibility, created by the use of economic
theory, confined to merger law. The Supreme Court, while insisting
that courts entertain economic evidence, has recently given judges and
juries a vote of no confidence in managing and deciding Sherman Act
cases.245 Trinko, for example, casts doubt on the ability of courts to
reach good outcomes in section 2 cases, citing:
1. High costs of false positives.246 The Court stated that even in the
best of circumstances the application of section 2 law “can be
difficult.”247
Mistaken inferences of anticompetitive effect are
“especially costly” because “they chill the very conduct the antitrust
laws are designed to protect.”248
2. Difficulty in evaluating refusals to deal. Courts may not be able
to properly evaluate refusals to deal “not only because they are highly
technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous,
given the incessant, complex and constantly changing interaction” of
the parties.249 Identifying the means of antitrust exclusion may prove a
“daunting task” for “generalist” antitrust courts.250
3. Costs of litigation. Antitrust enforcement in regulated industries
may lead very costly, “interminable litigation.”251
4. Lack of supervisory expertise. The courts are ill-equipped to
undertake the task of supervising forced sharing arrangements among
competitors on a day-to-day basis.252
Finally, the Court has urged judicial self-restraint, even in those cases
where the costs of enforcement do not outweigh the benefits of antitrust
intervention because the Sherman Act “does not give judges carte

245. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[I]t is self-evident that the
problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by ‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid instructions to juries,’; the threat of discovery expense will
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”
(internal citations omitted)); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P.,
540 U.S. 398, 414–15 (2004) (“[C]onduct consisting of anticompetitive violations . . . may be, as
we have concluded with respect to above-cost predatory pricing schemes, beyond the practical
ability of a judicial tribunal to control.” (internal quotations omitted)).
246. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 415.
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blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business
whenever some other approach might yield greater competition.”253
The upshot of Trinko is that it is difficult for courts to process
complicated economic evidence in antitrust cases and precisely because
of this reality, courts are likely to make mistakes in deciding these
cases. To avoid falsely condemning procompetitive conduct, courts
should not entertain— (i.e., dismiss at the outset) —such cases.
IV. IS ANTITRUST ALL THAT COMPLICATED?
Unquestionably, increased reliance on economics by courts and
litigants has led to a whole new dimension of complexity in antitrust
cases. Nowhere is that more evident than in merger practice under the
Merger Guidelines. With SSNIPs,254 UPPs,255 HHIs,256 and diversion
ratios, the merger arena has been transformed. Economics no longer
assists legal analysis; it now dictates legal analysis.
A. Mergers
Is this level of complexity necessary? A recent retrospective study of
government mergers by economist John Kwoka suggests that it is
not.257 After analyzing data on the FTC enforcement actions between
1996 and 2011, Kwoka made two significant observations. First, “the
probability of enforcement action is a strictly declining function of the
number of significant competitors in the market affected by the
merger.”258 Thus, in markets involving more than ten significant
competitors, there were no enforcement actions.259 In markets that went
from six firms to five, there were enforcement actions 35% of the
time.260 In three to two mergers, enforcement actions were initiated in
89% of the cases. In mergers to monopoly, enforcement actions took
place in 98% of the cases.261
Second, entry conditions are a significant factor in determining the
253. Id. at 415–16.
254. SSNIP refers to a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. See 2010 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 142, § 4.1.2 (defining SSNIP).
255. UPP refers to upward price pressures. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 142, §
6.1 (defining UPP).
256. For a discussion of the HHI, see supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
257. See generally John Kwoka, Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S.
Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 649 (2013).
258. Id. at 624.
259. Id. at 624 tbl. 3.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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outcome of investigations.262 Thus in all forty-five of the FTC
investigations where entry was deemed to be easy, the matters were
terminated without enforcement actions.263 On the other hand, where
entry was viewed as difficult, enforcement actions took place in over
80% of all investigations.264 Data further show a greater percentage of
enforcement actions occur where the HHI is greater, where the change
in HHI is greater, and where the number of significant competitors is
lower.265
Kwoka’s insight is as remarkable as it is simple. Concentration and
entry conditions are the key indicators of the likelihood of enforcement
action. That, in turn, suggests that perhaps the exhaustive treatment
offered in the Guidelines is not necessary after all.
B. Remember the Vertical Restraint Guidelines?
In 1985, flush with the success of the Merger Guidelines, the
Antitrust Division promulgated the Vertical Restraint Guidelines
(“VRG”).266
The VRG were designed to provide businesses,
consumers, and the courts with a roadmap to the Antitrust Division’s
analysis of a variety of vertically imposed restraints, including resale
price maintenance, territorial restraints, tying, and exclusive dealing.267
Like the Merger Guidelines, the VRG were heavily steeped in economic
theory; but unlike the Merger Guidelines, the VRG were not wellreceived. As Robert Pitofsky noted, the VRG were “in effect a
conservative brief against antitrust enforcement involving vertical
restraints rather than a statement of the law.”268 The VRG’s Vertical
Restraint Index, a quantitative measure of restraint analogous to the
HHI in the Merger Guidelines, was downright silly. 269 Nor did the

262. Id. at 625.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,105
(1985).
267. See 60 Minutes with J. Paul McGrath—Interview, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 131, 146 (1985)
(“Our hope would be that, as the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court in the future spell out
the rules that should be applied to nonprice vertical restraints, they would look at the kind of
thinking that went into the Vertical Guidelines, that they would give it some weight . . . .”).
268. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 217,
219 (1993).
269. See Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 287 (1986) (noting that the VRI as a
market structure screen is “incomplete”).
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VRG ever gain traction in the courts. The VRG were subsequently
rescinded by the Clinton Administration.270
The lesson from the VRG experience is that courts (and juries) can
reach reasoned outcomes in antitrust cases, including merger cases,
without reference to complicated quantitative tests. Even if one were to
accept the notion that antitrust cases as a group are inherently complex,
that does not mean that judges and juries cannot resolve antitrust issues.
Indeed, the jury trial is a fundamental feature of American jurisprudence
and is expressly authorized in private damage actions by the Clayton
Act.271 Notwithstanding the clear right to a jury trial in antitrust cases,
some have argued that antitrust cases are simply too complicated for
juries and that jury trial demands in such cases should be stricken.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue,
only the Third Circuit has held that some cases may, indeed, be too
complicated for juries.272 Still, the argument, now fueled by Twombly
and Trinko, persists; but it remains unpersuasive. The complexity
exception is both unwise and unnecessary. 273 Some antitrust issues are
indeed complex, but it is the job of the advocate to package the case in a
way that is understandable to jurors. This can be done in a variety of
ways.274 Attorneys can take advantage of technology and provide
visual aids through power point and video presentations to highlight
significant documentary and testimonial evidence.275 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide for bifurcating liability and damages
issues and also permit interrogatories to the jury to facilitate their
deliberations.276 In addition, the Manual for Complex Litigation
provides a variety of trial management techniques to streamline the
presentation of the case.277 Moreover, simple, common sense practices,
270. Anne K. Bingaman, Address before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Change and
Continuity
in
Antitrust
Enforcement
(Oct.
21,
1993),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0107.pdf (noting that the VRG were “controversial
from the outset” and that “they unduly evaluated theory over factual analysis and in certain
respects were at variance with existing case law”).
271. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
272. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F. 2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
273. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993)
(stating that “a reasonable jury is presumed to know and understand the law, the facts of the case,
and the realities of the market”).
274. See John F. Grady, Trial Management and Jury Control in Antitrust Cases, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 251 (1982) (commenting on trial strategy in antitrust cases).
275. Id. at 254.
276. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
277. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.
2004).
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such as permitting the jurors to take notes, allowing jurors to question
witnesses, providing jurors with glossaries of terms of art and exhibit
books, minimizing in-court objections and side-bars, and authorizing
intermediate summations by counsel serve to enhance the quality of jury
verdicts.278 In short, with the right tools, jurors are fully capable of
reaching good results.
Even if it were true that some antitrust cases were too complex for
juries, the answer to that problem would not be to leave matters up the
judge. As a matter of logic, if issues are too complicated for juries, they
may also be too complicated for judges.279 As the law now stands,
there would be no other body to hear and determine complex antitrust
cases. That, in turn, would suggest that at least some antitrust cases are
inherently non-justiciable. Given the enactment of the antitrust laws
and Congress’s clear mandate that the courts enforce these laws, that
outcome must be rejected out of hand, despite the push in that direction
by Twombly and Trinko.
Finally, the role of the jury in all cases, including antitrust cases, is to
bring the common sense of the community to bear on the factual issues
before it. However, when the jury is bombarded with expert economic
evidence, its verdict is less about bringing in the common sense of the
community to decide the issue and more about choosing between the
views of the plaintiff’s expert and the views of the defense expert. The
courtroom is then transformed into an intermediate microeconomic
classroom, precisely the scenario that the Supreme Court in Illinois
Brick sought to avoid. It is not important for the jury to decide which of
two competing economic models best describe a particular marketplace.
More important is that the jury applies good judgment to the facts
before it.
C. Structured Rule of Reason
In Sherman Act cases, the courts should strive to develop rules that
are clear, predictable, and easy to administer as an alternative to the
Chicago Board of Trade approach, which invites a broad, open-ended
inquiry into market conditions and business behavior.
That
freewheeling mode of analysis inevitably drives up litigation costs,

278. See Grady, supra note 274, at 252–54 (commenting on methods to increase accuracy of
jury verdicts).
279. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 414 (2004) (noting that the identification of unlawful exclusionary conduct “would surely be
a daunting task for a generalist antitrust court”).
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complicates issues, and renders outcomes less predictable. These
undesirable side effects could be avoided by implementation of a
structured rule of reason. The Court of Appeals decision in Three
Tenors280 could serve as a template:
We therefore accept the Commission’s analytical framework. If,
based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is
obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the
restraint is presumed unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the
defendant must either identify some reason the restraint is unlikely to
harm consumers or identify some competitive benefit that plausibly
offsets the apparent or anticipated harm. That much follows from the
caselaw; for instance, in NCAA the Court held that a “naked restraint
on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis.” Similarly, in IFD, the
Supreme Court ruled a horizontal agreement to withhold services
could not be sustained because the dentists failed to advance any
“credible argument” that “some countervailing procompetitive virtue .
. . [redeemed] an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the
‘ordinary give and take of the marketplace.’”281

Alternatively, courts could strike down those restraints that have been
imposed despite the existence of a less restrictive alternative. 282 The
point is that endless sifting of market data and economic analysis is not
necessary in order to reach a reasoned decision in rule of reason cases.
In the section 2 realm, the Microsoft283 approach provides a courtfriendly roadmap to analyzing monopolization cases:
1. Determine whether defendant has monopoly power;
2. Determine whether defendant has committed bad acts;
3. Once the plaintiff establishes market power plus bad acts, the
burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with procompetitive
justifications for its conduct;
4. Absent any justification or given an asserted justification that is
mere pretext, the defendant will be held liable under section 2;
5. If the defendant’s conduct has true procompetitive benefits, then
the defendant would be liable only if the anticompetitive effects
outweigh the procompetitive benefits.284

280. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
281. Id. at 36.
282. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 33 (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (noting courts’ alternatives to analyzing economic and market data).
283. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 51–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
284. Id. at 50–59.
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This analytical process involves the exercise of traditional judicial
functions with a minimum reliance of economic theory. Of course, the
real challenge for the courts in applying a structured rule of reason
analysis, whether under section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act, is the
weighing of procompetitive benefits against anticompetitive effects.
That process is both imprecise and difficult. As Areeda and
Hovenkamp have observed, “[b]ecause both theory and data are usually
insufficient and because quantification in terms of a common
denomination is usually impossible, balancing will inevitably be crude
and should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.”285 Using the
foregoing analysis, courts would rarely reach the point where balancing
would be necessary. In the rare case of a “tie,” the conduct should be
condemned unless defendants can come forward with a less restrictive
alternative.286 In other words, once significant anticompetitive effect
has been proven, any “tie” would go to the plaintiff.287
CONCLUSION
In an admirable attempt to achieve good outcomes in antitrust cases,
federal courts have embraced economic theory to an unprecedented
extent. The result has been a more complicated, less predictable body
of law, which is increasingly costly to litigate in the courts and before
federal agencies. This is a far cry from what Congress had in mind
enacting the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Courts need to rethink
the role of economics in antitrust litigation and restore the balance
between fact and economic theory to produce rules that are clear,
predictable, administrable, and just.

285. See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 425 (3d ed. 2010).
286. See Cavanagh, supra note 41, at 468.
287. Id.

